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FACTOrS BEHiND WEAK TAX MOrAlE:  
THE CASE OF EUrOPEAN UNiON COUNTriES
Virgilijus rutkauskas*
Institute of Social Welfare, Lithuania
Abstract. This article investigates the theoretical and practical aspects of tax morale among households in 
European Union countries. The attitude of households on tax payment is assessed quantitatively by employing 
a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis. The research is based on household-level data received from 
the World Values Survey and the European Values Study. Weak tax morale among European Union households 
is mainly determined by the perception of corruption, disrespect to one’s own country and parliament. Additio-
nally, a household’s tax morale depends on age, gender, religiousness, level of income and education. Based on 
the findings of this article, a more precise policy guidance is presented. 
Keywords: tax morale, tax evasion, tax avoidance, willingness to pay taxes, logit-probit analysis.
1. Introduction
Payment of taxes is an agreement among tax payers and the state. Tax payers commit to 
pay taxes and the state provides public goods and security that otherwise would not be 
available in a market economy. However, a universal aversion to tax theory contradicts 
the previous statement in a way that every rational economic agent will tend to increase 
its wellbeing by reducing tax payments and seeking public benefits. Practical outcomes 
support this statement: for instance, 90 % of public income is raised from tax contributions, 
but, at the same time, one fifth consists of uncollected taxes. Therefore, attention to the 
practical and theoretical examination of factors that have the most pronounced influence 
to tax payment is growing rapidly.
Two main indicators – tax base and tax ratio – are unable to fully and comprehensively 
explain changes in tax payments, suggesting an existence of other explanatory variables. 
This is the reason behind the growing attention to the alternative factors, which could 
disclose factors under unwillingness to pay taxes as more accurate. The main drawback 
of tax morale studies is the lack of suitable data sources: the assessments in this field 
are based on data provided by surveys, experiments, or laboratory outcomes, since tax 
evasion pertains to a criminal background. 
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8The aim of this paper is to reveal factors affecting unwillingness to pay taxes in 
European Union countries. The analysis of tax morale is based on the data provided 
by the World Values Survey and the European Values Study. Data received from these 
surveys are quantitatively assessed by employing dichotomous logit-probit regression 
models. In this paper, the author runs 132 logit-probit regression models for all European 
Union countries separately in periods starting from 1981 till 2013. The most significant 
factors behind unwillingness to pay taxes are revealed and described for every country. 
Results of this paper are beneficial for practitioners, because public authorities could 
direct their efforts more precisely to increase tax compliance, and for academia, as views 
on the alternative factors under tax payers’ decisions are still quite rare.
Without the introduction and conclusions, this paper constitutes of four main 
sections. The second section reveals the importance of taxes in contemporary economy. 
Third section deals with main factors behind tax collection. In the fourth section, the 
methodological issues of quantitative assessment of tax morale are presented. in the 
fifth section of this paper, the results of quantitative assessment of tax morale are 
demonstrated. Some theoretical ideas (in the third section of this paper) to some extent 
have been published by the author (Rutkauskas, V., and ivaškaitė-Tamošiūnė, V. (2015). 
Vengimas mokėti mokesčius ir jo vertinimas Baltijos šalyse. Pinigų studijos, 15 (2), 
pp. 74–87); however, this article presents a much broader and deeper assessment of tax 
morale questions. 
2. Role of taxation in economy
Taxes are affecting economy and behavior of tax payers in different ways. As Levine-
Schayowitz (2005) presents, when governments raise taxes, people alter their behaviors 
and make decisions they would not make otherwise. This suggests that when the behavior 
of private citizens is affected by a tax, the allocation of resources changes as well. 
Because taxes raise the prices buyers pay, providing incentives to consume less, and 
the lower the prices sellers receive, providing incentives to produce less, the size of the 
market shrinks below its optimum level in the sense that revenues raised by government 
taxation may be less than the distorting market outcomes. Therefore, to better understand 
the impact of taxation on behavior, it is necessary to consider how taxes influence the 
prices consumers pay, the quantities consumers demand, and the resulting tax revenues 
raised. Changes in tax policies also affect decisions to participate in the labor market, 
the choice of occupation, tax avoidance schemes, and the degree of tax evasion activities 
through participation in the formal or informal sector of the economy. 
Taxes constitute the main part of the public sector income in modern economies 
(see Fig. No. 1). Usually changes in tax collection determine whether the government 
is running a budget surplus or deficit. in the case of the public sector having more 
income and savings rather than expenditures, public spending towards consumption and 
9investment increases without building up debt. This makes a positive contribution to the 
general economy because public spending increases ceteris paribus aggregate demand. 
In the case of public expenditure remaining higher for a  longer period, the widening gap 
between income and expenditure needs to be covered by borrowed funds or decrease 
in reserves (in case a country has any reserves available). Both outcomes are generally 
unwelcome, because the growth of debt means an increase in debt burden for future 
generations and, usually, it is a leading indicator for future tax increases. 
FIG. No. 1. income sources of General government in 2014 
Sources: Eurostat and author’s calculations. 
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Three taxation sources – value added tax, taxes on income and wealth and social 
contributions – are the main ones, as they amounted up to 83-84 % of total tax income 
in the period from 2002 till 2015 in the euro area countries (see Fig. No. 2). In this 
particular case, only countries of the euro area have been presented because the majority 
of the European Union non-euro area countries are lacking comprehensive who-to-whom 
statistics; however, it could be assumed that, in general, tax income structure in the whole 
of european Union is very close to that presented in Fig. no. 2. As this paper investigates 
issues behind tax morale only among households, it is important to clarify the share that 
households hold in tax contributions. It is clear that income and wealth taxes as well as 
social contributions (the majority of them) are paid by households. national accounts 
do not provide final payers of value added tax and put it as payment made by the total 
national economy. However, value added tax is recorded as being borne by purchasers, 
not sellers, and then only by those purchasers who are not able to deduct it. Thus, the 
greater part of this tax is recorded as being paid on final uses, mainly on households for 
their consumption (European Commission, 2013). Based on this, an assumption in this 
paper is made that all value-added taxes have been paid solely by households. Detailed 
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national accounts data reveal that in the period between 2002 and 2015, in the euro area, 
nearly 77-78 % of general government total income funds were received as taxes payed 
by households, since households are the main payers of taxes (see Fig. no. 2). Also, an 
assumption could be made that a close four-fifth of all tax income in the european Union 
has been paid by households. Thus, an investigation of willingness to pay taxes should 
be mainly directed at households and their behavioral determinants.
FIG. No. 2. General government tax income structure by payer in the euro area 
Sources: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and author’s calculations. 
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3. Factors behind tax collection
In contemporary economic theory, the payment of taxes is a bilateral agreement between 
an economic agent and the state, because the latter one, as has been discussed in the 
second section of this paper, is basically grounded on that way of funding. Economic 
agents agree to pay taxes to the state in order to receive public goods and security in 
return. At the same time, economic agents are rational seekers of benefit as compared to 
cost and will try to avoid or minimise tax payment and will simultaneously seek public 
goods and security (see Fig. No. 3). Samuelson (1954) argued that the private provision 
of public goods will be inefficiently low because everyone will have an incentive to “free 
ride” on the private purchases of others. The theory of general reluctance to pay taxes 
also brings arguments that are contrary to the concept of conscious taxpayers’ agreement 
with the state. The fiscal illusion theory adds that a rational economic agent realises the 
need to have balanced public finance (the expenditures on public goods and security 
should not exceed income of the state in the long run). Notwithstanding this, a rational 
economic agent tends to seek financial benefits from the state and not pay for public 
goods and services via taxes. Thus, this behavior is assessed as irrational.
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FIG. No. 3. The relation of cheating on tax and claiming state benefits 
Sources: European Value Study (2008) and author’s calculations. 
Note: the growth in numbers represents a greater justification.
There are three possible ways to deal with taxation: 1) agree to pay taxes; 2) evade 
taxes; 3) avoid taxes. Agreement to pay taxes is not under aim of this paper, thus will not 
be assessed further in this article. Tax evasion and tax avoidance have at once similar and 
different meanings that must be clarified. According to the organization for economic 
Cooperation and Development, tax evasion is linked to illegal agreements among parties 
in order to conceal on taxes or elude for fulfilment tax liabilities. meanwhile, tax avoidance 
is linked to searching for legal abilities enabling to diminish tax payments (OECD, 2015). 
For the purpose of this article, differences between tax evasion and tax avoidance are not 
that important because the result of general unwillingness to pay taxes is under concern and 
not the type of it (whether this is evasion or avoidance). By taking this into account, in the 
scope of this paper, tax evasion and tax avoidance have been taken as synonyms. 
The most famous income tax avoidance model was presented in 1972 by m. Allingham 
and A. Sandmo. Their research was based on G. S. Becker’s work, titled Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach. In this paper, G. S. Becker proposes to look at tax 
payment as an optimal portfolio formation exercise, where a tax payer rather chooses 
to take risky position and not to pay taxes, but faces probability to be audited by tax 
authority. Either that, or a tax payer can choose a safe portfolio and pay taxes as it is 
stated in the law. S. Yitzhaki (1974) complemented the model with a fine in case the fact 
of tax evasion is detected. Such an approach allows for investigating the sensitivity of 
tax payer behaviour to factors like probability to be audited, fines, tax rate, etc. However, 
this model receives some critique that is acknowledged by authors, too. The weakest 
point is the made assumption that a tax payer receives benefit only by avoiding paying 
taxes, because the classical model does not consider the economic goods and services 
that are provided by the state. Thus, the only rational outcome, in this case, would be to 
avoid paying taxes and free-ride as it is suggested by Samuelson (1954). This drawback 
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is well perceived by the authors; however, because of its simplicity, this model is still 
commonly used to explain unwillingness to pay taxes. 
Why are people paying taxes? This question has been raised by J. Alm et al. (1992) 
and the results of their experiment suggest that compliance occurs because some 
individuals overweigh the low probability of audit, although such overweighing is not 
universal. Compliance does not occur simply because individuals believe that evasion 
is wrong, since subject behavior is unchanged using either neutral or loaded terms. 
Moreover, there is evidence that individuals pay taxes because they value the public 
goods that their taxes are financing. An increase in the amount that individuals receive 
from a given tax payment increases their compliance rate. At this stage, it should be 
noted that individuals exhibit a remarkable diversity in behavior. They sometimes appear 
to overweigh low probabilities, they sometimes appear to be risk-seeking; they are on 
occasion cooperative, and at other times they are free-riders.
TABLE No. 1. The quantitative assessment of factors behind tax morale
Reference
Sample and 
econometrics
Tested  
variables
Significant variables
B. Torgler 
(2005)
Switzerland. Data from 
the ISSP. Year 1998. 
Weighted ordered 
probit estimation
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment status, 
personal income, church atten-
dance, direct democracy, trust 
placed in the court and legal 
system, tax rate, fine rate and au-
dit probability, culture variables 
(language dummy variables)
Education (+)
Students and pensioners (+)
Trust placed in the court and legal 
system (+)
Religiousness (+)
Democracy (direct) (+) 
J. Martínez-
Vázquez,  
B. Torgler 
(2005)
Spain. Data from 
WVS and EVS. Years 
1981, 1990, 1995 and 
1999/2000. Weighted 
ordered probit 
estimation.
Gender, age, marital 
status, employment status, 
religiousness, trust placed in the 
parliament, national pride, time 
dummy variables
Tax morale is stronger in the 90s 
than in the 80s
Age and religiousness (+)
Upper-class individuals (–)
Trust in the parliament and 
national pride (+)
J. Prieto et al. 
(2006)
Spain. Data from the 
ISSP. Year 1998
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, self-employed, social 
class, size of municipality of 
residence, voted political party
Age (+)
Self-employed (–)
Voters for nationwide parties (+)
B. Torgler,  
F. G. 
Schneider 
(2006)
Spain, Switzerland and 
Belgium. Data from 
the WVS (1995-97) and 
the EVS (1999-2000). 
Weighted ordered 
probit estimation
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment status, 
social class, personal income, 
church attendance, direct 
democracy, national pride, 
trust in political institutions and 
government, attitude towards 
democracy, personal income 
tax rate, fine rate and audit 
probability (for Switzerland), 
culture variables (regional and 
language dummy variables).
Cultural and regional differences 
affect tax morale in both 
Switzerland and Spain
Trust placed in the legal system, 
the government and parliament, 
national pride, and prodemocratic 
attitudes (+)
Religiousness (Belgium and 
Switzerland ) (+)
Direct democracy (Switzerland) (+)
Women (+)
13
Reference
Sample and 
econometrics
Tested  
variables
Significant  
variables
B. Torgler 
(2006)
32 world countries 
(mainly EU). Data from 
the WVS (1995-1997). 
Weighted ordered 
probit estimation
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment status, 
social class, financial situation, 
risk aversion, religiousness 
(church attendance, religious 
education, activity in a church 
group, the importance of 
religion, religious guidance, trust 
placed in church), corruption, 
trustworthiness
Religiousness (+)
Age (+)
Risk aversion (+)
Upper-class individuals (–)
Financial satisfaction (+)
Retired, home workers, and part 
time employed (+)
Women (+)
Married (+)
Living together (–)
Education (–)
Trustworthiness (+)
Perceived corruption (–)
J. Alm, 
B. Torgler
(2006)
USA and Spain. Data 
from the WVS. 1999-
2000. Common cross-
country slopes are 
imposed. Weighted 
ordered probit 
estimation
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment status, 
church attendance, trust placed 
in the parliament, country 
dummy variables
Tax morale is lower in Spain than 
in the USA
Age (+)
Religiousness (+)
Women (+)
Married (+)
J. Alm,  
B. Torgler 
(2006)
16 EU countries. 
Data from the WVS 
(1990-93). Common 
cross-country slopes 
are imposed. Weighted 
ordered probit estima-
tion
Gender, age, marital status, 
employment status, church 
attendance, country dummy 
variables
Age (+)
Religiousness (+)
Self-employed (+)
Pensioners (+)
Married (+)
R. G. Cu- 
mmings et al. 
(2007)
Botswana (1999) and 
South Africa (2000). 
Data from Afroba-
rometer. Common 
cross-country slopes 
are imposed. Ordered 
probit estimation
Gender, age, education, 
employment status, country 
dummy variables
Age (+)
Source: author based on Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010). 
Recent research results in tax payment field recognize that models like those 
proposed by m. Allingham and A. Sandmo lack explanatory power on some occasions. 
It is suggested that the behavioural economics theory could add to the classical model 
more realistic factors, such as psychological comfort, prestige of paying taxes and others. 
Daude et al. (2012) explain that tax morale is based on the aspiration to be honest with the 
state and other tax payers and trust the government. For instance, poor quality of public 
goods could be perceived by a tax payer as dishonest behaviour by the authorities and, 
thus, result in unwillingness to buy public goods by avoiding tax payment. T. O. Weber 
TABLE No 1 (Continuation)
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et al (2014) claims that the main challenge in investigating tax morale is the criminal 
background of such activity. Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010), in their paper, titled 
The Determinants of Tax Morale in Comparative Perspective: Evidence from European 
Countries are providing an informative summary of quantitative researches in the tax 
morale field, reviewing most common data, methods and, most importantly, tested and 
significant variables (see Table no. 1). 
Based on the results provided in Table No. 2, it could be summarised that the main 
factors influencing tax morale are these: the justification of corruption, national pride, 
confidence placed in the parliament (government), the importance of religion, the 
level of income and education, employment and marital status, the gender and age of 
a respondent. Based on these findings, in the fourth section of this paper, a quantitative 
assessment of significant variables is presented. 
4. Quantitative assessment of tax morale
The scarcity of data is common for researches in the field of tax morale as such activity 
has a criminal background. One of the commonly used sources is the World Values 
Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS) data (see Table No. 2). These 
globally performed regular surveys investigate respondents’ opinions of different fields, 
such as living conditions, family, religion, society, policy and economy. martinez-
Vazquez and Torgler (2005), Alm and Torgler (2006), Torgler and Schneider (2006), 
Lago- Peñas and Lago- Peñas (2010) have used WVS and EVS data for investigating 
tendencies within willingness to pay taxes. Moreover, WVS and WVS are based on a 
common methodology. Thus, data are comparable among time and countries. 
TABLE No. 2. independent variables used in assessing tax morale 
Independent variable Numerical expression of response
Acceptance of bribe 1 – never; …; 10 – always
Age X years
Confidence in parliament 1 – high; …; 4 – non
Employment status 1 – employed; …; 8 – unemployed
Gender 1 – men; 2 – women
Level of education 1 – non; …; 8 – higher
Level of income 1 – small; …; 10 – high
Marital status 1 – married; …; 7 – not married 
National proud 1 – high; …; 4 – non
Religiousness 1 – yes; …; 3 – no
Source: author’s, based on WVS and EVS. 
Considering that the survey data usually are categorical variables, according to 
Gujarati, (2004) a simple linear regression is not suitable and instead a logit-probit 
regression analysis model should be used. Such an approach is also supported by a 
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number of researchers in the tax morale field (see Table no. 1). As a dependent variable 
for analysis, the answers of individual households to the question Cheating on taxes if 
you have a chance are taken with possible answers varying from 1 (never) to 10 (always). 
In order to receive as much of an informative assessment as possible, 10 independent 
variables have been chosen (see Table No. 2). Moreover, Table No. 2 presents a numerical 
expression of response to particular questions that will be used further by interpreting the 
results of our analysis. 
10 independent variables and one dependent variable have been considered in order 
to investigate the issues behind tax morale for every single European Union country 
and 2-8 are selected as significant. The significance of independent variables is based 
primarily on the measure of p-value. The suitability of the whole model (1) is assessed 
not by a coefficient of determination, as it is common for liner regressions, but by a 
share of classified cases. The case is assessed as classified, when the results received 
by the model are the same as collected during the survey for every individual response. 
As Gujarati (2004) suggests, more than 50 % of classified cases by the model allow for 
assessing the model as suitable (however, the bigger the share the better). 
 
(1)
where: i – country; s – survey; bn – coefficient; P – probability; C – Constanta; TM – tax 
morale; G – gender; A – age; MS – marital status; Ed – education; Em – employment; 
I – income; R – religiosity; CP – confidence in parliament; NP – national proud; B – 
acceptance of bribe. 
For the researchers in the tax morale field, it is common to use dichotomous (binary) 
instead of multinomial logit-probit regressions. According to Torgler and Schneider 
(2006), the main reason behind this is a lack of depended categorical indicators to perform 
any reliable analysis. To explain the main factors behind tax payers’ behavior, at least 20 
% of opposite indicators should appear for every combination of variables (the same rule 
is applied in other types of logit-probit regressions). Otherwise, the explanatory power of 
a model decreases sharply. However, some categories are lacking data to ensure this 20 
% rule; thus, it is common to use dichotomous regressions instead of multinomial logit-
probit ones. Thus, for the dependent variable – tax morale – two possible outcomes are 
assigned (1 or 0; instead of a range from 1 to 10). In the case of a respondent declaring 
that he never cheated on taxes, the outcome is “0”, as this shows strong tax morale. in 
the case of an answer to the question Cheating on taxes if you have a chance range being 
from 2 to 10, it has been assumed that the respondent lacks tax morale and the outcome 
is “1”. Based on this, the equation (1) could be rewritten as follows (2):
1). As a dependent variable for analysis the individual households’ answers to question 
“Cheating on taxes if you have a chance” are taken with possible answers varying from 1 
(“never”) to 10 (“always”). In order to receive as informative assessment as possible 10 
independent variables have been chosen (see table 2). Moreover, table 2 presents numerical 
expression of response to particular questions that will be used further by interpreting results of 
analysis.  
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results received by the model are the same as collected during the survey for every individual 
response. As Gujarati (2004) suggests, more than 50 % of classified cases by the model allows 
assessing the model as suitable (however the bigger the share the better).  
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behind this is lack of depended categorical indicators to perform reliable analysis. To explain 
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categories are lacking data to ensure this 20 % rule, thus it is common to use dichotomous instead 
of multinomial logit-probit regressions. Thus for the dependent variable – tax morale – two 
possible outcomes are assigned (1 or 0; instead of range from 1 to 10). In case respondent 
declared that one never cheated on taxes the outcome is “0” as this shows strong tax morale. In 
case answers to the question “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance” range from 2 to 10 it has 
been assumed that respondent lacks tax morale and the outcome is “1”. Based on this equation (1) 
could be rewritten as follows (2): 
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Moreover, importance of independent variables of the model is assessed by odds ratio of 
coefficients. Odds ratio of coefficient is a specific ratio for logit-probit models and shows how 
dependent variable could change in case one of independent variables will increase by 1 and all 
others will remain unchanged. Odds ratio is defined as the ratio of the probability of success 
P(Y=1) and failure P(Y=0) or P(Y=1)/P(Y=0). This ratio is assumed as the main one in assessing 
importance of independent variables to dependent one. The value of odds ratio could vary from 
close to 0 (in case probability of failure is approaching to 100) and to infinity (in case probability 
of success is approaching to 100).  
TABLE 3. Independent variables used in assessing tax morale  
 Change of independent variable 
+ 1 – 1 
Odds 
ratio 
< 1 P(Y=1) < P(Y=0) Growth in tax morale 
P(Y=1) > P(Y=0) 
Decrease in tax morale 
> 1 P(Y=1) >P(Y=0) Decrease in tax morale 
P(Y=1) < P(Y=0) 
Growth in tax morale 
Source: author.  
By analyzing dependent variable, it is important to observe whether the value of 
independent variable odds ratio is bellow or above 1. In case odds ratio is 1, the probabilities of 
success and failure are equal to 0.5. Growth of value of independent variable by 1 with odds ratio 
below 1 means that dependent variable has higher probability to success (P(Y=1)) than to failure 
(P(Y=0)). Contrary, growth of value of independent variable by 1 with odds ratio above 1 means 
that dependent variable has lower probability to success (P(Y=1)) than to failure (P(Y=0)). For 
the purpose of this paper an assessment of independent variables odds ratios is presented in table 
3. 
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Moreover, importance of independent variables of the model is assessed by odds ratio of 
coefficients. Odds ratio of coefficient is a specific ratio for logit-probit models and shows how 
dependent variable could change in case one of independent variables will increase by 1 and all 
others will remain unchanged. Odds ratio is defined as the ratio of the probability of success 
P(Y=1) and failure P(Y=0) or P(Y=1)/P(Y=0). This ratio is assumed as the main one in assessing 
importance of independent variables to dependent one. The value of odds ratio could vary from 
close to 0 (in case probability of failure is approaching to 100) and to infinity (in case probability 
of success is approaching to 100).  
TABLE 3. Independent variables used in assessing tax morale  
 Change of independent variable 
+ 1 – 1 
Odds 
ratio 
< 1 P(Y=1) < P(Y=0) Growth in tax morale 
P(Y=1) > P(Y=0) 
Decrease in tax morale 
> 1 P(Y=1) >P(Y=0) Decrease in tax morale 
P(Y=1) < P(Y=0) 
Growth in tax morale 
Source: author.  
By analyzing dependent variable, it is important to observe whether the value of 
independent variable odds ratio is bellow or above 1. In case odds ratio is 1, the probabilities of 
success and failure are equal to 0.5. Growth of value of independent variable by 1 with odds ratio 
below 1 means that dependent variable has higher probability to success (P(Y=1)) than to failure 
(P(Y=0)). Contrary, growth of value of independent variable by 1 with odds ratio above 1 means 
that dependent variable has lower probability to success (P(Y=1)) than to failure (P(Y=0)). For 
the purpose of this paper an assessment of independent variables odds ratios is presented in table 
3. 
Moreover, the importance of independent variables of the model is assessed by the 
odds ratio of coefficients. The odds ratio of coefficient is a specific ratio for logit-probit 
models and shows how a dependent variable could change in case one of independent 
variables increasing by 1 and all others remaining unchanged. The odds ratio is defined 
as the ratio of the probability of success P(Y=1) and failure P(Y=0) or P(Y=1)/P(Y=0). 
This ratio is assumed as the main one in assessing the importance of any independent 
variables to a dependent one. The val e of odds ratio could vary from close to 0 (in case 
a probability of failure is approaching to 100) and to infinity (in case a probability of 
success is approaching to 100). 
TABLE No. 3. independent variables used in assessing tax morale 
Change of independent variable
+ 1 – 1
Odds ratio
< 1
P(Y=1) < P(Y=0)
Growth in tax morale
P(Y=1) > P(Y=0)
Decrease in tax morale
> 1
P(Y=1) >P(Y=0)
Decrease in tax morale
P(Y=1) < P(Y=0)
Growth in tax morale
Source: author. 
By analysing a dependent variable, it is important to observe whether the value of an 
independent variable odds ratio is below or above 1. In case of the odds ratio being 1, 
the probabilities of success and failure are equal to 0.5. The growth of an independent 
variable’s value by 1 with an odds ratio below 1 means that the dependent variable has 
a higher probability for success (P(Y=1)) than failure (P(Y=0)). On the contrary, the 
growth of an independent variable’s value by 1 with an odds ratio above 1 means that the 
dependent variable has a lower probability for success (P(Y=1)) than failure (P(Y=0)). 
For the purpose of this paper, an assessment of independent variables odds ratios is 
presented in Table No. 3.
5. The results of ax moral  analysis among European Union countries
During the period between 1981 d 2013, 132 surveys on individual households in all 
contemporary European Union countries have been conducted. The most covered countries, 
with 8 surveys performed during the abovementioned period, are Spain and Sweden, the 
least – Greece and Luxembourg. Data received for every single country have been assessed 
separately by applying a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis and results, in an 
alphabetical order, are presented below (odds ratios could be found in Table No. 4).
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The surveys in Austria have been conducted in 1990, 1999 and 2008. The main factors 
behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis, are 
the perception of corruption, national pride, religion and marital status. All these factors 
are statistically significant (the only exception being for the national pride factor in the 
last survey) and ensures 69-72 % of positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, 
the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more 
an individual will tend to accept bribe, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The 
case of Austria suggests that citizens who foster less national pride will tend to evade 
taxes more, as it is the case with religiousness as well. Moreover, not married or single 
people present a greater probability in their behaviour to avoid taxes. 
The surveys in Belgium have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2009. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are gender, national pride, trust placed in the parliament, and the perception of 
corruption. All these factors are statistically significant (based on p-value) and ensure 
66-71 % of positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant 
factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend 
to accept bribery attempts, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of 
Belgium suggests that citizens who foster less national pride or place less trust within the 
parliament will tend to evade taxes more. Moreover, men present a greater probability in 
their behaviour avoid taxes than women in Belgium.
The surveys in Bulgaria have been conducted in 1991, 1997, 1999, 2005 and 2008. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption, national pride, marital status, income and 
gender. All these factors are statistically significant (the only exception being for marital 
status in the first survey) and ensure 66-79 % of positive cases by the models. Based on an 
odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – 
the more person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more that individual will try to 
evade paying taxes. The case of Bulgaria suggests that citizens who foster less national 
pride will tend to evade taxes more; also, respondents that receive greater incomes will 
tend to evade taxes more. Moreover, not married or single people and men in particular 
present a greater probability in their behaviours to avoid taxes.
The surveys in Croatia have been conducted in 1996, 1999 and 2008. The main factors 
behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis, are the 
perception of corruption, confidence placed in the parliament, age and income. All these 
factors are statistically significant and ensure 70-73 % of positive cases by the models. 
Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of 
corruption – the more person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will try to 
evade paying taxes. The case of Croatia suggests that citizens who place less confidence 
within the parliament will tend to evade taxes more. Also, older people have a lesser 
tendency to avoid taxes, although wealthier people tend to cheat on taxes more. 
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The surveys in Cyprus have been conducted in 2006, 2008 and 2011. The main factors 
behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis, are the 
perception of corruption, national pride, religion, and employment status. Not all factors 
are statistically significant for Cyprus; however, they all have been kept in model in order 
to ensure consistency among years and substantial share of positive cases (79-90 %). 
Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of 
corruption – the more an individual will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will 
try to evade paying taxes. The case of Cyprus suggests that citizens who foster less national 
pride will tend to evade taxes more, as it is the case with religiousness as well. 
The surveys in the Czech Republic have been conducted in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 
2008. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit 
regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, national pride, gender and age. 
All these factors are statistically significant and ensure 69-75 % of positive cases by 
the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the 
perception of corruption – the more an individual will tend to accept bribery attempts, 
the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of the Czech Republic suggests that 
citizens who foster less national pride will tend to evade taxes more. moreover, women 
and older people are less probable to avoid taxes. 
The surveys in Denmark have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption, confidence placed in the parliament, religiosity, 
age and gender. All these factors are statistically significant and ensure 61-71 % of 
positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind 
tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery 
attempts, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Denmark suggests that 
citizens who place less confidence within the parliament will tend to evade taxes more, 
as it is the case with individuals who espouse less religious behaviour. Moreover, men 
and younger respondents are regarded as more probable to avoid taxes.
The surveys in Estonia have been conducted in 1990, 1996, 1999, 2008 and 2011. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are perception of corruption, national pride, religion and marital status. All 
these factors are statistically significant and ensure 66-76 % of positive cases by the 
models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the 
perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the 
more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of estonia suggests that citizens who 
foster less national pride will tend to evade taxes more. Moreover, males and younger 
individuals are more probable to avoid taxes.
The surveys in Finland have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005 
and 2009. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-
probit regression analysis, are perception of corruption, age, gender, and religion. All 
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these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 66-70 % of 
positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind 
tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery 
attempts, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Finland suggests that 
citizens more devoted to religion tend to evade taxes less. moreover, women and older 
people are regarded as less probable to avoid taxes in Finland.
The surveys in France have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999, 2006 and 2008. 
The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit 
regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, age, gender, and national pride. All 
these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensures 66-70 % of 
positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind 
tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery 
attempts, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of France suggests that 
individuals who foster more national pride tend to evade taxes less. Moreover, women 
and older persons are less probable to avoid paying taxes.
The surveys in Germany have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2006, 2008 
and 2013. The latest survey is not suitable for this research, because there were no data 
on a dependent variable. Thus, a summary of results given below are from 6 surveys. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption, age, status of employment, and national pride. 
All these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 67-76 % 
of positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor 
behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more an individual will tend 
to accept bribery attempts, the more one will be prone to evade paying taxes. Close to 
the odds ratio of the perception of corruption in Germany is national pride – the more a 
person fosters national pride, the more likely it is that individual will pay taxes. The case 
of Germany suggests that unemployed individuals or those with lower salaries will tend 
to evade taxes less. Moreover, older people are regarded as less probable to avoid taxes. 
The surveys in Greece have been conducted in 1999 and 2008. The main factors 
behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis, 
are the perception of corruption and national pride. All these factors are statistically 
significant (with an exception for national pride for the first survey) and ensure 65-77 % 
of positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor 
behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept 
bribery attempts, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. Moreover, the case of 
Greece suggests that people who foster higher feelings of national pride will tend to 
avoid cheating on taxes more.
The surveys in Hungary have been conducted in 1982, 1991, 1998, 1999, 2008 and 
2009. The survey conducted in 1982 is excluded in this paper because no answers to the 
question on the willingness to pay taxes had been presented. The main factors behind tax 
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evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis in the reminder 
of surveys, are the perception of corruption, age, level of education, income and national 
pride. All these factors are statistically significant (with an exception for income for the 
fourth survey) as measured by p-value and ensure 68-81 % of positive cases by the models. 
Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is national pride – the 
more an individual will foster national pride, the less one will try to evade paying taxes. 
The case of Hungary also suggests that the more citizens tend to accept bribery attempts 
the higher is the chance of them evading taxes. Moreover, individuals with a higher income 
and education will ten to evade taxes more, as it is the case with younger individuals.
The surveys in Ireland have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. The main 
factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis, 
are the perception of corruption, age, gender, and national proud. All these factors are 
statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 66-70 % of positive cases 
by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is 
the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, 
the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Ireland suggests that the more 
citizens foster national pride, the less they may evade taxes. moreover, women and older 
people are less probable to avoid taxes.
The surveys in Italy have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999, 2005 and 2008. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption, age, and national pride. All these factors are 
statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 65-72 % of positive cases by 
the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the 
perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the 
more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of italy suggests that citizens who 
foster greater national pride have a lesser tendency to evade paying taxes. Moreover, 
older people are less probable to avoid taxes.
The surveys in Latvia have been conducted in 1990, 1996, 1999 and 2008. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption, age, gender and national pride. All these factors 
are statistically significant (with the exception of one year’s model for the national pride 
indicator) as measured by p-value and ensure 70-76 % of positive cases by the models. 
Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception 
of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will 
try to evade paying taxes. The case of Latvia suggests better tax collection from those 
people who foster greater national pride. Moreover, women and older individuals present 
a lesser probability in their behaviour to avoid taxes.
The surveys in Lithuania have been conducted in 1990, 1997, 1999 and 2008. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption, age, income and national pride. All these factors 
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are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensures 65-74 % of positive cases 
by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is 
the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, 
the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Lithuania suggests that national 
pride plays significant role for citizens in making decisions whether to pay taxes or not: 
greater national pride is directly linked to stronger tax payments. Moreover, people with 
higher incomes tend to avoid taxes more.
TABLE No. 4. Variation of most important independent variables coefficients’ odds ratios
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Austria 1.1-1.2 1.2 1.3-1.6 1.9-2.5
Belgium 0.6-0.8 1.3 1.3 1.3-1.4
Bulgaria 0.7 1.1 1.1-1.2 1.3-1.5 1.5-4.8
Croatia 1.0 1.1-1.2 1.2-1.4 1.7-2.6
Cyprus 0.9-1.1 1.2 1.2-1.4 2.6-4.5
Czech Rep. 0.6-0.7 1.0 1.2-1.4 1.4-2.0
Denmark 0.5-0.7 1.0 1.2-1.4 1.3-1.4 1.4-2.2
Estonia 0.6-0.8 1.0 1.2-1.4 1.5-7.0
Finland 0.5-0.7 1.0 1.2-1.6 1.9-2.3
France 0.6-0.7 1.0 1.2-1.5 1.3-1.5
Germany 1.0 0.9-1.1 1.2-1.5 1.4-3.0
Greece 1.2 1.5-2.0
Hungary 1.0 1.1-1.4 1.1 1.3-1.9 1.2-1.7
Ireland 0.6-0.7 1.0 1.4-1.8 1.7-2.3
Italy 1.0 1.2-1.3 1.2-2.8
Latvia 0.7 1.0 1.1-1.3 1.5-2.0
Lithuania 1.0 0.9-1.1 1.3-1.5 1.3-2.8
Luxembourg 1.2-1.3 1.4-1.8
Malta 1.4-2.2 2.3-5.7
Netherlands 0.6-0.8 1.0 1.6-3.4
Poland 1.0 1.4-1.7 1.5 1.4-5.3
Portugal 1.0 1.2 1.3-3.2
Romania 1.0 1.1 1.2-1.4 1.2-1.7 1.3-2.9
Slovakia 1.0 1.1-1.5 1.4-2.2
Slovenia 0.6-0.8 1.0 1.2-1.5 2-10
Spain 1.0 1.2-1.3 1.2-1.5 1.7-3.3
Sweden 0.6-0.7 1.0 1.1-1.2 1.1 1.2-1.5 1.3-1.6 1.2-1.4 1.4-2.1
UK 1.0 1.2-1.4 1.3-3.9
Source: author’s calculations. 
* odds ratio for age is 0.94-0.99. 
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The surveys in Luxembourg have been conducted in 1999 and 2008. The main factors 
behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis, are 
the perception of corruption and the level of education. All these factors are statistically 
significant as measured by p-value and ensure 60-67 % of positive cases by the models. 
Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception 
of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will 
try to evade paying taxes. The case of Luxembourg suggests that tax evasion increases in 
line with the growth of one’s education level.
The surveys in Malta have been conducted in 1983, 1991, 1999 and 2008. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption and religion. All these factors are statistically 
significant as measured by p-value and ensures 83-86 % of positive cases by the models. 
Based on n odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of 
corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will 
try to evade paying taxes. The case of malta suggests that more religious citizens tend 
to evade taxes less. 
The surveys in the Netherlands have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999, 2006, 
2008 and 2012. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous 
logit-probit regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, age and gender. All 
these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensures 63-74 % of 
positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind 
tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery 
attempts, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Netherlands suggests 
that older citizens will tend to evade taxes less (however, last survey showed slightly 
opposite estimations). Moreover, women tend to avoid taxes less. 
The surveys in Poland have been conducted in 1989, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2005, 2008 
and 2012. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-
probit regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, national pride, confidence 
placed within the parliament and age. All these factors are statistically significant as 
measured by p-value and ensure 63-76 % of positive cases by the models. Based on an 
odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption 
– the more person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will try to evade 
paying taxes. The case of Poland suggests that people who place more confidence within 
the parliament and foster greater feelings of national pride tend to avoid taxes less as it 
is the case with the older generation.
The surveys in Portugal have been conducted in 1990, 1999 and 2008. The main 
factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption, age and religiousness. All these factors are 
statistically significant as measured by p-value (except for the age in the last survey) 
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and ensure 61-79 % of positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most 
significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person 
will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The 
case of Portugal suggests that more religious and older people tend to avoid taxes less.
The surveys in Romania have been conducted in 1993, 1998, 1999, 2005, 2008 and 
2012. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit 
regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, national pride, confidence placed 
within the parliament, marital status and age. All these factors are statistically significant 
as measured by p-value and ensure 63-79 % of positive cases by the models. Based 
on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of 
corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will try 
to evade paying taxes. The case of Romania suggests that older people and those who 
foster greater national pride tend to avoid taxes less. Moreover, married people and those 
who place more confidence within the parliament tend to avoid paying taxes less. 
The surveys in Slovakia have been conducted in 1991, 1998, 1999 and 2008. The 
main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis, are the perception of corruption, age and national pride. All these factors are 
statistically significant as measured by p-value (except age for the first survey) and ensure 
64-76 % of positive cases by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant 
factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to 
accept bribery attempts, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Portugal 
suggests that older people and those who foster greater national pride tend to avoid taxes 
less.
The surveys in Slovenia have been conducted in 1992, 1996, 1999, 2005, 2008 and 
2011. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit 
regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, gender, age and national pride. All 
these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value (except gender for the 
fourth survey) and ensures 68-86 % of positive cases by the models. Based on an odds 
ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the 
more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one will try to evade paying 
taxes. The case of Slovenia suggests that women, older people and those who foster 
greater national pride tend to avoid taxes less.
The surveys in Spain have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2007, 
2008 and 2011. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous 
logit-probit regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, age, religiousness 
and national pride. All these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value 
(except religiousness for the fourth survey) and ensures 65-80 % of positive cases by 
the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the 
perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the 
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more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Spain suggests that older, more 
religious citizens and those who foster greater national pride tend to avoid taxes less. 
The surveys in Sweden have been conducted in 1981, 1982, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2006, 
2009 and 2011. In 1981, the survey results in Sweden were presented by the WVS, in 
1981, the same results were presented by the EVS; thus, these two surveys are evaluated 
as a single survey in this paper. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a 
dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, national 
pride, confidence placed within the parliament, religiousness, the level of income 
and education, the age and gender of a respondent. All these factors are statistically 
significant as measured by p-value and ensure 65-73 % of positive cases by the models. 
Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception 
of corruption – the more an individual will tend to accept bribery attempts, the more one 
will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Sweden suggests that older, more religious 
citizens, those who foster greater feelings of national pride and place confidence 
within the parliament tend to avoid taxes less. On the contrary, the ones with a higher 
level of education and income, as well as men in general, are more prone to avoid 
paying taxes. 
The surveys in the United Kingdom have been conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999, 
2005 and 2009. The main factors behind tax evasion, as suggested by a dichotomous 
logit-probit regression analysis, are the perception of corruption, age and religiousness. 
All these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value (except for the 
acceptance of bribery attempts for the first survey) and ensure 66-77 % of positive cases 
by the models. Based on an odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is 
the perception of corruption – the more a person will tend to accept bribery attempts, the 
more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of the United Kingdom suggests that 
older, more religious citizens tend to avoid taxes less. 
Results of the tax morale analysis in all European Union countries suggest that the 
common factors behind weak tax morale are a wide spread of corruption, weak national 
pride, age and gender. Based on this, it could be stated that people who are prone to take 
bribes, have weak national pride, are younger and are males possess a greater probability 
in their behaviour to avoid taxes. moreover, religiousness and confidence placed within 
the parliament have a strong, direct, positive link with the willingness to pay taxes (see 
Table No. 4 and Fig. No. 4), as more religious tax payers and those who place more 
confidence within the parliament tend to cheat on taxes less. For some countries, the 
level of education is playing a role, while people who have received higher education 
tend to evade taxes more. The level of income and employment status give various 
results: on some occasion, these factors make a direct, for some – an indirect impact; 
thus, assessment depends on the country and year of the survey. 
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FIG. No. 4. The variation of odds ratios of independent variables sorted by distance from 1 (left – largest one) 
Source: author’s calculations. 
These empirically assessed variables of tax morale in the European Union countries 
are guidelines for tax authorities in particular and for the public sector in general for 
seeking to increase tax collection. As the robust results of this research suggest (all of 
the regressions have more than 50 % of positive cases), the main efforts directed at 
increasing tax collection should be directed to fight corruption and foster national pride. 
More efforts of national authorities investigating tax evasion should be directed at males 
and younger citizens. Additionally, individuals with higher education and those with 
higher levels income tend to evade taxes more; however, this has been evidenced only 
for some of countries under investigation. Moreover, religiousness is closely linked to 
the proper payment of taxes and a high level of tax morale. 
According to Weber (2014) tax morale could be increased by signing the “tax payer’s 
honor code”, as this in general will increase the dependence on society (thus, on national 
pride). Trust in government and tax authority plays a noticeable role for tax morale; 
thus, the image of public institutions should find a place in any government’s agenda. 
moreover, the quality of public goods is not the least important to be considered while 
making decisions to pay taxes or not; thus, the quality of goods as well as the quality 
of the institutions themselves should be constantly monitored and increased (it is partly 
linked to corruption, trust placed within the parliament). Weber (2014) continues that 
public institutions with a reputation of using a coercive mechanism should find a way 
to earn the reputation of high quality service providers. e. F. Luttmer and m. Singhal 
(2014) add that cooperation between the state and the individual tax payer increases 
tax morale, as well as the dependency to the group and cultural effects, which, in the 
long run, could lead to higher tax compliance. Also, it should be important for tax 
authorities to investigate tax payers that are of younger age and male with greater depth 
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and attention, also not overlooking taxpayers who have acquired higher levels education 
and income. As this research suggests and as other authors confirm, the payment of taxes 
could be increased not only by applying pressure to tax payers, but also by employing 
soft measures. 
6. Conclusion
The main share of the public sector income constitutes of tax contributions. However, 
rational economic agents tend to simultaneously avoid tax payments and consume public 
goods. Classical models of unwillingness to pay taxes are not always able to explain factors 
behind weak tax morale. Empirically it is evidenced that higher taxes expenditures have 
negative correlation with a tax payment gap (thus, tax morale) suggesting a contradiction 
among mainstream thinking. Moreover, it suggests the existence of alternative factors 
rather than taxation base and tax rate. , the aim of this paper is to fulfill the gap of 
comprehensive analysis of tax morale in the European Union countries. 
Issues behind weak tax morale are disclosed with alternative methods suggested by 
tax morale studies and is assessed quantitatively by employing a dichotomous logit-probit 
regression analysis for all the European Union countries on 132 occasions. The results of 
tax morale analysis in all of the European Union countries suggest that main factors behind 
weak tax morale are corruption and weak national pride. More efforts of national authorities 
while investigating tax evasion should be applied to males and tax payers of younger age. 
Additionally, more educated people and those with a higher income tend to evade taxes 
more; however, this has been evidenced only for some of the countries under investigation. 
Also, religiousness has a direct, strong and positive link (especially in some countries) to 
the willingness in paying taxes; also, people in marriage tend to evade taxes less. 
A systematic assessment of factors behind weak tax morale, as it is presented by the 
author in this paper, are a set of guidelines for public authorities in the field of greater tax 
morale in a country and, additionally, better collection of taxes. Different measures, like 
signing the tax payer honor code, ensuring a better quality of public goods, putting more 
efforts to make citizens place more trust within the state and foster feelings of pride that 
relate to the state and an increase in patriotism should be employed in order to increase 
tax morale. After employing similar measures, the public sector could expect closing the 
gap between the real collection of taxes and planned tax collection, thus ensuring a better 
standing of public finance and the abilities to provide goods and services for the same 
households.
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